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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is essentially a collection action. The Defendant, FIA Card Services, N.A. 
(hereinafter "FIA"), secured an award letter from the National Arbitration Forum WAF] without 
proof of a valid agreement to arbitrate. When a copy of the award 1.etter was sent to the Plaintiff, 
David F. Capps, (hereinafter "Capps"), Capps filed an action to vacate the award letter. FIA 
filed counterclaims of account stated and breach of contract to collect on the alleged delinquent 
credit card debt. FIA then filed for summary judgment. The district court granted FIA's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Capps appealed. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Capps filed a complaint against FIA and the NAF in the Idaho County District Court on 
August gth 2007 (R. Vol. I, p. 1 - 7) after receiving an award letter from the NAF (R. Vol. I, p. 
33), to have the award letter vacated under Idaho Code Title 7, Chapter 9, Section 912. The 
Defendant, NAF removed the action to Federal District Court based on Capps' claim of violation 
of civil rights under Article 7 of the U.S. Constitution. Capps subsequently amended the 
complaint on October lzth 2007 (R. Vol. I, p. 15 - 20) and dismissed the NAF from the action, 
substituting a violation of the Idaho State Constitution, specifically Article 1, Section 7, for the 
federal claim. The action was then remanded to the State District Court for further proceedings. 
FIA filed an Answer to Complaint with Counterclaims on January 30" 2008 (R. Vol. I, p. 
26 - 33). The counterclaims included Application of Arbitration Award, Breach of Contract, and 
Account Stated. 
After initial discovery requests, Capps filed a Motion to Compel Discovery on April 4"' 
2008 (R. Vol. IV, p. 594 - 600). The district court granted Capps' Motion to Compel on April 
29'h 2008 (R. Vol. IV, p. 601 - 602). FIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the court's order, 
which the court denied in its Memorandum Decision and Order on July 22nd 2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 
492 - 498). FIA also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 191h 2008 (R. Vol. V, p. 
603 - 604) with supporting memorandum (R. Vol. V, p. 605 - 610). Capps filed his Opposition 
to Motion for Summary Judgment on June loth 2008 (R. Vol. 11, p. 34 - 51). The district court 
granted FIA's Motion for Summary Judgment on July 28'h 2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 499 - 515). 
Capps filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 51h 2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 5 16 - 525) wit11 
affidavit (R. Vol. 111, p. 526 - 529) and a Motion for Continuance Under Rule 56(f) (R. Vol. 111, 
p. 541 - 543) with affidavit (R. Vol. 111, p. 544 - 546). Capps also filed a Motion to Show Cause 
on September 11" 2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 559 - 564), because FIA had not properly complied with 
the order of the court concerning discovery. The district court denied the Motion to Show Cause 
on October 30' 2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 565 -566). The district court granted the reconsideration 
for the Account Stated claim, but denied the reconsideration for the Breach of Contract claim on 
October 30'" 2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 573 - 580), resulting in a final judgment on Novenlber 12'" 
2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 581 - 582). Capps timely filed his Notice of Appeal 011 November 1 8'h 
2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 583 - 588). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Comerica Bank Bankcard Services originally created the alleged credit card account and the 
associated receivables. Both the account and the associated receivables were acquired by 
MBNA America Bank, N.A. and subsequently sold to a Master Trust in a process known as 
securitization. The securitization transaction took place before the alleged debt was claimed to 
have become delinquent in January of 2005. Bank of America acquired MBNA America Bank 
on January 2nd 2006, at which time the MBNA Master Credit Card Trust TI, used for 
securitization, officially became pail of the BA Master Credit Card Trust 11, with the Bank of 
New York as trustee. FIA Card Services became the "Sewicer" of the Mastcr Trust nine and a 
half months later on October 2oth 2006 pursuant to the Second Amended and Restated Pooling 
and Servicing Agreement. Despite repeated requests from Capps, FIA has refused to provide 
any documents showing that the alleged debt was acquired by FIA from the Master Trust. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
ISSUE N0.1 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT? 
Capps demanded a jury trial in his Complaint. FIA filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which the district court granted. Capps filed a Motion for Reconsideration, during 
which he presented evidence of a dispute of a material fact, specifically, the amount of the 
alleged debt. The district court recognized the dispute of a material fact on the Account Stated 
claim, but not on the Breach of Contract claim. In determining the amount of the judgment in 
the Breach of Contract claim, the district court either had to weigh the evidence, or ignore the 
dispute of a material fact. Because Capps had demanded a jury trial, the court was not allowed 
to weigh the evidence, nor was it allowed to ignore a dispute over a material fact. 
ISSUE NO. 2 
DID THE DXSTRICT COURT ERR BY IGNORING RULE 1004(3) OF THE 
IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE? 
Capps provided a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy 
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA 
refused to provide the document. Capps providedpvima facie evidence that the document was 
what it was purported to be. FIA did not object to the document on the grounds that it was not 
authentic. FIA's lack of an objection as to tile authenticity of the document is a tacit admission 
that the document is, in fact, authentic. The document is proof that FIA is not a real party in 
interest in this action and constitutes a dispute of a material fact, which should have precluded 
granting summary judgment by the district court. 
ISSUE NO. 3 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR BY IGNORING RULE 1008c OF THE 
IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE? 
Capps provided a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy 
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA 
refused to provide the document. Capps providedp~ima facie evidence that the document was 
what it was purported to be Under Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. FIA did not 
object to the document as not being authentic and did not provide a certified copy of the 
document in its place. The authenticity and weight of the document was for the jury to decide, 
not the district court. The document is proof that FIA is not a real party in interest in this action 
and constitutes a dispute of a material fact, which should have precluded granting summary 
judgment by the district court. 
ISSUE NO. 4 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR BY NOT ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF A DISPUTE 
OF A MATERIAL FACT, AND THEN USING THE EXCLUDED EVIDENCE AS THE 
BASIS FOR ITS DECISION? 
Capps provided a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit Card Trust IT, and notified FIA that the copy 
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible undcr Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy ofthe contract during discovery and FIA 
refused to provide the document. Capps providedpvima facie evidence that the document was 
what it was purported to be Under Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. FIA did not 
object to the docunlent as not being authentic and did not provide a certified copy of the 
document in its place. The authenticity and weight of the document was for the jury to decide, 
not the district court judge. The document is proof that FIA is not a real party in interest in this 
action and constitutes a dispute of a material fact, which should have precluded granting 
summary judgment by the district court. 
ISSUE NO. 5 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS BY RENDERING A 
DECISION BEFORE DISCOVERY WAS COMPLETE AND BEFORE THE 
CASE WAS RIPE? 
Capps raised two aflrmative defenses in his ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIMS (R. 
Vol. I, p. 22), inter alia, that "18. The Defendant is not a real party in interest in this action and 
cannot maintain a counterclaim Action against the Plaintiff,'' And that "1 9. The Defendant 
cannot establish standing and as such cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this court for its 
counterclaims." Capps was pursuing FIA's financial records as proof that FIA had removed the 
account in question from its books as a result of the sale of the account and the associated 
receivables to the BA master Credit Card Trust I1 and was no longer owner of the alleged debt. 
Capps filed a MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (R. Vol. IV, p. 594-600), which the district 
court granted. FIA's answers were evasive and incomplete. Capps filed a MOTION TO SHOW 
CAUSE regarding the evasive and incomplete answers. The district court DENIED the motion 
based on the fact that it had dismissed Capps' claims (R. Vol. 111, p. 565). 
ISSUE NO. 6 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE? 
Capps raised two affirmative defenses in his ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIMS (R. 
Vol. I, p. 22), inter alia, that "18. The Defendant is not a real party in interest i11 this action and 
cannot maintain a counterclaim Action against the Plaintiff." And that "19. The Defendant 
cannot establish standing and as such cannot invoke the jurisdiction ofthis court for its 
counterclaims." Capps was pursuing FIA's financial records as proof that FIA had removed the 
account in question from its books as a result of the sale of the account and the associated 
receivables to the BA master Credit Card Trust I1 and was no longer owner of the alleged debt. 
Capps filed a MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (R. Vol. IV, p. 594-600), which the district 
court granted. FIA's answers were evasive and incomplete. Capps filed a MOTION TO SHOW 
CAUSE regarding the evasive and incomplete answers. The district court DENIED the motion 
based on the fact that it had dismissed Capps' claims (R. Vol. 111, p. 565). 
ISSUE NO. 7 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR BY RELYING ON AN UNSETTLED CASE 
AS THE BASIS FOR ITS DECISION? 
Capps provided a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy 
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA 
refused to provide the document. Capps provided prima facie evidence that the document was 
what it was purported to be Under Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. FIA did not 
object to the document as not being authentic and did not provide a certified copy of the 
document in its place. The authenticity and weight of the document was for the jury to decide, 
not the district cow.  The document is proof that FIA is not a real party in interest in this action 
and constitutes a dispute of a material fact, which should have prevented granting summary 
judgment by the district court. 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE NO. 1 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Capps demanded a jury trial in his Complaint. FIA filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which the district court granted. Capps filed a Motion for Reconsideration, during 
which he presented additional evidence of a dispute of a material fact, specifically, the 
amount of the alleged debt. The district court recognized the dispute of a material fact on the 
Account Stated claim, but not on the Breach of Contract claim. In determining the amount of 
the judgment in the Breach of Contract claim, the district court either had to weigh the 
evidence, or ignore the material dispute. Because Capps had demanded a jury trial, the 
district court was not allowed to weigh the evidence, nor was it allowed to ignore a dispute 
over a material fact. 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On a motion for summary judgment we will review "the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, to determine whether there is a 
genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c); Rcay v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131,120 Idaho 117,814 
P.2d 17 (1991). 
Where, as here, a jury has been requested, the non-moving party also is entitled to the 
benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidentiary facts. See 
Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 660,651 P.2d 923,925 (1982). 
C. THERE WAS A GENUINE DISPUTE OVER A MATERIAL FACT. 
On a motion for summary judgment there must be no dispute over the material facts of tlie 
case and the party moving for summary judgment must be entitled to the judgment as a matter of 
law. In this case, Capps presented two dispute letters that were sent, the first to Conierica Bank 
Bankcard Services (R. Vol. 111, p. 530), and the second to MBNA America Bank, N.A. (R. Vol. 
111, p. 531). 
The district court, in its MEMORAMDUM DECISION AND ORDER filed October 30 
2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 573 - 580), stated, "Mr. Capps is correct with respect to his asgunent that 
FIA's claim of an account stated fails. I conclude, on reconsideration, that the accounting was 
disputed by Mr. Capps." (R. Vol. 111, p. 577, L. 16 - 18). Yet the district court failed to 
recognize the same dispute of a material fact in FINS Breach of Contract claim. The same 
d&x&e letters disputed the amount FIA claimed in its breach of contract claim iust as the account 
stated claim was disputed. 
Capps also provided a copy ofthe Prospectus dated October 11,2005 (R. VoI. 11, p. 71- 
272) and a copy of the Second Amended and Restated Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated 
October 20,2006 (R. Vol. 11, p. 273-414) as part of his OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed June 10,2008 (R. Vol. 11, p. 34-51) based on Rule 17(a) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. FIA's sole objection was that the Prospectus and the Pooling 
and Servicing Agreement are not based on Capps' personal knowledge (R. Vol. V, p. 640, L. 3- 
4). FIA claims that nothing in the Capps affidavit "establishes that Plaintiff has any personal 
knowledge regarding the preparation, maintenance andlor subject matter of the proposed 
Exhibits" (R. Vol. V, p. 640, L. 6-7). While Capps may not have personal knowledge of the 
preparation and maintenance of the documents, he certainly has personal knowledge of the 
existence of the documents, and based on the briefing involved, he also has personal knowledge 
regarding the subject matter of the documents. The contents of the affidavit certainly establish 
that there is a Prospectus and a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (R. Vol. 11, p. 53-55) and that 
the contents of those documents are essential to Capps' defense against the Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. Vol. 111, p. 545-546). 
An affidavit submitted in the process of summary judgment may establish certain facts 
based on personal knowledge that satisfies the requirements of Rule 56(e). In Smith v. Board of 
Corrections, 133 Idaho 519,988 P.2d 1193 (1999), the court noted, "Despite the shortcomings of 
the affidavits noted by the district court, portions of the affidavits are based on personal 
knowledge and do satisfy the requirements of Rule 56(e)." The Capps affidavits establish that 
Capps has personal knowledge that a Prospectus has been issued by MBNA, and subsequently 
by Bank of America, relating to the securitization process used by both MBNA and Bank of 
America for the credit card receivables and the associated accounts. The affidavits also establish 
that Capps has personal knowledge that a Pooling and Servicing Agreement exists between 
MBNA, Bank of America, and the associated Master Trust for the securitization of credit card 
receivables and their associated accounts, the accuracy and authenticity of which is not contested 
by FIA. 
The documents themselves are relevant to Capps' affirmative defense that FIA is not a real 
party in interest and that FIA has no damages, and as such cannot establish standing, thus failing 
to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Whether a party is a real party in interest is a recognized 
dispute of a material fact, which would preclude summary judgment, see Tolmie Farms v. J.R. 
Simplot Co., 124 Idaho 613,862 P.2d 305 (1992). 
In the district court's MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER dated July 28 2008, the 
district court judge stated, "Without a proper foundation being laid to establish Mr. Capps' 
personal knowledge and without qualifying for an exemption to the hearsay rule, the affidavit of 
Walker F. Todd, the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, and the Trust Prospectus may not be 
considered." (R. Vol. 111, p. 507, L. 4-7). The district court then went on to say, "Despite my 
decision that they are not admissible, I have reviewed in full the Second Amended and Restated 
Pooling and Servicing Agreement attached as Exhibit 2 as well as the MBNA Credit Card 
Master Note Trust Prospectus attached as Exhibit 1 to Mr. Capps' affidavit as a basis for 
deciding FIA's standing and aualification as the real party in interest." (Emphasis added) (R. 
Vol. 111, p. 508, L. 17-21). Obviously the district court recognized that there was a genuine 
dispute over the material fact regarding standing, otherwise, it would not have seen any need to 
weigh the evidence and render a decision. Because the district court judge used the Pooling and 
Servicing Agreement and the Prospectus as the basis for his decision, the documents have been 
tacitly and impliedly admitted and are therefore "on the record". The district court cannot deny 
Capps the right to use the disputed evidence, and then use that same evidence as the basis for 
deciding against him. 
Capps had demanded a jury trial making the jury the trier of fact, not the district court 
judge. FIA's standing and qualification as the real party in interest was for the jury to decide. 
Because the district court judge had tacitly and impliedly admitted the Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement and the Prospectus as evidence, the weight of the evidence, and the decision 
regarding standing and the real party in interest was clearly for the jury to decide. 
111 the district court's MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER dated July 28 2008, the 
district court judge also stated, "Even assuming that the affidavits and documents should be 
considered, Mr. Capps still fails to meet his burden of coming forward with evidence by way of 
affidavit, deposition, or otherwise, which contradicts the evidence submitted by the moving party 
and which establishes a material issue of disputed fact. The Pooling and Servicing Agreement 
and the Trust Prospectus documents attached as exhibits to Mr. Capps' Affidavit are cited by Mr. 
Capps in support of his affirmative defense that FIA Card Services lacks standing and is not a 
real party in interest. These exhibits do not relate directly to whether or not there was a contract 
formed and breached or whether an account stated agreement was reached -the two bases of 
FIA's motion for summary judgment. See Opposition to Motionfor Summary Judgment at 2-8." 
What the district court ignores is that a motion for summary judgment has basic 
requirements: "if the pleading, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of Law." 1.R.C.P 56(c). (Emphasis added). Whether FIA has 
standing, and whether FIA is a real party in interest, are jurisdictionaI questions and relate 
directly to whether FIA is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In Tolmie Farms, supra, the 
court stated, 
Courts must take extreme care not to take genuine issues of fact from the jury. See 
Wilson v. Westinghouse Electric C'orp., 838 F.2d 286,289 (8th Cir.1988); see also Lowry 
v. Ireland Bank, 1 16 Idaho 708,779 P.2d 22 (Ct.App. 1989) (a determination of 
credibility should not be made on summary judgment if credibility can be teqted in court 
before the trier of fact). (Emphasis in original). 
In m, there was conflicting evidence as to who was actually the real party in interest. The 
court stated, 
"Altl~ough Simplot complains of the dearth of any official documentation to support the 
alleged assignment of rights to the Tolmies, such argument goes to the weight of the 
evidence and presents a genuine question of fact for the jury." 
In this case there is no dearth of documentation. Here the Pooling and Servicing Agreement 
clearly states (R. Vol. 11, p. 298), 
"Section 2.01. Conveyance of Receivables. The Transferor hereby transfers, assigns, sets over, 
and otherwise conveys to the Trustee, without recourse, all of the Transferor's right, title and 
interest in, to and under the Receivables existing at the close of business on the Amendment 
Closing Date, in the case of Receivables arising in the lnitial Accounts (including all related 
Transferred Accounts), and at the close of business on the related Addition Date, in the case of 
Receivables arising in the Additional Accow~ts (including a11 related Transferred Accounts), and 
in each case thereafter created from time to time in such Accounts until the termination of the 
Trust, all monies due or to become due with respect to such Receivables (including all Finance 
Charge Receivables), all Interchange allocable to the Trust as provided herein, all proceeds of 
such Receivables, Insurance Proceeds and Recoveries relating to such Receivables and the 
proceeds thereof." The Transferor is identified as, "BA Credit Card Funding, LLC, a Delaware 
limited liability con~pany" (R. Vol. 11, p. 279) and is the company used by Bank of America to 
transfer assets into the BA Master Credit Card Trust 11 (hereinafter "the Master Trust"). 
The Pooling and Servicing Agreement also states (R. Vol. 11, p. 298), "In connection with 
such transfer, assignment, set-over and conveyance, the Transferor agrees to record and file, at 
its own expense, all financing statements (including any amendments of financing statements 
and continuation statements when applicable) with respect to the Receivables now existing and 
hereafter created for the transfer of accounts (as defined in the Delaware UCC) meeting the 
requirements of applicable state law in such manner and in such jurisdictions as are necessary to 
perfect and to maintain the perfection of the assignment of the Receivables to the Trustee,. . ." 
(Emphasis added). The same Pooling and Servicing Agreement in section 2.05 states (R. Vol. 11, 
p. 306), "Covenants of the Transferor. The Transferor hereby covenants that: (a) Receivables to 
be Accounts. . . . The Traxlsferor will take no action to cause any Receivable to be anything other 
than an account (as defined in the Delaware UCC)." In Section 2.09 the Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement states (I<. Vol. 11, p. 3 15), "Additional Representations and Warranties of the 
Transferor. . . .(b) The Collateral constitutes "accounts" within the meaning of the Delaware 
UCC." "Account" as defined in the Delaware UCC is, ''5 9-102. Definitions and Index of 
Definitions. (a) Article 9 definitions. (2) "Account", except as used in "account for" means (i) 
a right to payment of a monetary obligation whether or not earned by perforniaiice, (G) arising 
out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card." 
All rights, including the right to payment of the alleged monetary obligation, were assigned to 
the BA Master Credit Card Trust If, without recourse. No rights were retained. While FIA 
argues that the Receivables and the Account are two different things, the Pooliiig and Servicing 
Agreement explicitly defines account as defined in the Delaware UCC (R. Vol. 11, p. 289), which 
defines "account" as being identical to the Receivables that were assigned to the Master Trust. 
In McCIuskv v. Galland, 95 Idaho 472,511 P.2d 289 (Idaho 1973), the Supreme Court of 
Idaho held, "Where open account and notes payable to individual were assigned to corporation 
prior to commencement of action to recover on the notes and the open account, the individual 
assignor was not real party in interest and had no standing to prosecute an action to recover 011 
the notes and the open account and was not entitled to recover judgment thereon. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 17(a), I.C. $3 5-301,s-302,27-104." 
In addition, Delaware statute (Delaware is the "home"state of FIA Card Services), Title 6 ,  
Chapter 27A, $ 2703A(1) clearly states, "Any property, assets or rights purported to be 
transferred, in whole or in part, in the securitization transaction shall be deemed to no longer be 
the property, assets or rights of the trmsferor." Clearly, the inference of the above information, 
taken in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (Capps in this case) in a motion for 
summary judgment, establishes a genuine issue of fact for the jury. 
FIA had the burden of showing that there were no genuine issues over the material facts in 
its motion for summary judgment. Simply stating that there are no genuine issues of the material 
facts is insufficient. Capps had raised two genuine issues of material fact in his affirmative 
defenses and had presented evidence in support oEFIA not being a real party in interest, not 
having any damages, and as a result, did not have standing and could not invoke the jurisdiction 
of the court. The burden fell to FIA to prove that it was in fact the real party in interest and that 
it had experienced actual financial damages and in fact had standing in the district court. FIA 
presented no evidence of ownership of the receivables or the account, no evidence of damages, 
and no evidence that FIA had the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court. FIA failed 
to prove there were no genuine issues of material fact to support its motion for summary 
judgment as required under Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The district court judge committed reversible error in weighing the evidence and rendering 
a decision when it was for the jury to decide. The district court judge also committed reversible 
error in deciding FIA had met its burden of establishing that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact in its motion for summary judgment when no evidence was presented opposing 
Capps' evidence of FIA's lack of standing. Capps therefore requests that this court VACATE 
the summary judg~nent against him, VACATE the district court's decision that FIA has standing 
and is a real party in interest, and REMAND the case for ajury trial. 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE NO. 2 
DID THE DISTRlCT COURT ERR BY IGNORING RULE 1004(3) OF THE 
IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Capps provided a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy 
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA 
refused to provide the document. Capps providedpvimafacie evidence that the document was 
what it was purported to be. FIA did not object to the document on the grounds that it was not 
authentic. FIA's lack of an objection as to the authenticity of the document is a tacit admission 
that the document is, in fact, authentic. FIA has thus waived any objection as to authenticity of 
the Pooling and Servicing Agreement. The document is proof that FIA is not a real party in 
interest in this action and constitutes a dispute o fa  material fact, which should have precluded 
summary judgment. 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When questions of law are presented, the Supreme Court exercises free review and is not bound 
by findings of the trial court, but is free to draw its own conclusions from the evidence presented. 
Accomazzo v. CEDU Educational Services, Inc., 135 Idaho 145, 15 P.3d 1153. 
The construction and application of a statute or statutes present pure questions of law, which 
are freely reviewed on appeal. Wilder v. Miller, 135 Idaho 382, 17 P.3d 883. 
C. THE EVIDENCE WAS ADMISSIBLE 
While case law is lacking in the State of Idaho on Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho Rules or 
Evidence, the rule itself was drawn from the Federal Rules of Evidence, retaining the same 
numbering system and the same wording. The same basic issue also appears in the Idaho Code, 
Title 9, Chapter 4, Section 9-403. This court may find the cited cases in federal courts regarding 
Rule 1004(3) persuasive. 
Rule I004 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence reads as follows: 
Rule 1004. Admissibility of other evidence of contents. 
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing, recording, or 
photograph is admissible if: 
(1) Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the 
proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith; or, 
(2) Originals not obtainable. No original can be obtained by any reasonably 
practicable, available judicial process or procedure; or, 
(3) Original in possession of opponent. At a time when an original was under control 
of the party against whom offered, that party was put on notice, by the pleadings or 
otherwise, that the contents would be a subject of proof at the hearing; and the party 
does not produce the original at the hearing; or 
(4) Collateral matters. The writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related to a 
controlling issue. (Adopted January 8, 1985, effective July 1, 1985.) 
In Capps' AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Capps put FIA on notice regarding the SECOND AMENDED AND 
RESTATED POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT as follows (R. Vol. 11, P. 54, L. 21- 
23 and p. 55, L. 1-5): 
"33. That I received tile document "SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED 
POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT dated as of October 20,2006" in the 
process of discovery from MBNA in a previous case. 
"34. That the document has not been modified or altered in any manner. 
"35. That a true and correct copy of the document is presented as EXHIBIT 2. 
"36. That to the best of my knowledge the documents presented are true and correct 
copies of authentic documents. 
"37. That the documents are intended as evidence and are presented as such." 
EXHIBIT 2 appears in the record on appeal (R. Vol. 11, p. 273-414). 
Regarding Rule 1004(3), the Second Amended and Restated Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement (PSA) was an internal document to MBNA and subsequently, through the sale of 
MBNA to Bank of America, is in the possession of Bank of America. As of the date of the 
restated agreement, the document was in continuous possession of Bank of America. The above 
sworn affidavit providedprima facie evidence to the district court that the document was what it 
was purported to be. Since the original document was in possession of the other party (FIA via 
Bank of America), the only valid objection from FIA would have been that the document was 
not authentic. No such objection was made. The authenticity of the document was therefore 
uncontested, and was admissible under Rule 1004(3) as urged by Capps in his Motion for 
Reconsideration (R. Vol. 111, p. 553) as follows: 
"The original document is in possession of the opponent and Capps has no other opportunity 
to obtain a certified copy of the document with affidavits suitable to have the document 
entered as evidence. dipps submitted the document with his opposition to summary 
judgment, putting FIA on notice that the contents would be a subject of proof at the hearing. 
FIA did not produce the original or a certified copy at the hearing and has refused to provide 
the docunlent in discovery. FIA has also had sufficient time to object to the accuracy and 
authenticity of the document and has not done so. The document previously submitted is 
thus admissible under Rule l004(3) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence." 
The book, Federal Rules of Evidence, in the section on wrjtings, recordings, and 
photographs, page 630, under HISTORY, ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES, Rule 
1004(3) has the following explanation: 
"Paragraph (3). A party who has an original in his control has no need for the protection 
of the rule if put on notice that proof of contents will be made. He can ward off 
secondary evidence by offering the original. The notice procedure here provided is not to 
be confused with orders to produce or other discovery procedures, as the purpose of the 
procedure under this rule is to afford the opposite party an opportunity to produce the 
original, not to compel him to do so. McCormick § 203." 
In Mack v. Marlel, 241 F.R.D. 534; 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33020; 73 Fed. R. Evid. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 446, the cowl stated, 
[**I721 Additionally, fHN781 Rule 1004 permits proof of the contents of a writing, 
recording or photograph by secondary evidence when the proponent of the evidence is 
unable to obtain an original through use of legal process, or when the original is in 
possession or control of an adverse party that has actual or inquiry notice of the contents 
that the proponent intends to introduce the evidence. In the later circumstance, as the 
advisory committee's note to Rule 1004(3) points out, "[a] party who has an original in 
his control has no need ibr the protection of the [original writing] rule if put on notice 
that proof of contents will be made. He can ward off secondary evidence by offering the 
original." 
Capps provided both actual and inquiry notice to FIA. Actual notice was provided in Capps' 
affidavit, supra, "37. That the documents are intended as evidence and are presented as such." 
Capps also provided inquiry notice to FIA during discovery, specifically, "INTERROGATORY 
-4: Please identify the Pooling and Servicing Agreement in effect as of July isth 2005." and 
"REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENT NO. 22: Please provide or make 
available for copying a certified copy of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement identified in 
Interrogatory No. 4, with proper authentication and foundation from a custodian of records 
sufficient to allow the document to be admitted as evidence in this case." 
FIA refused to provide the requested document. Capps submitted a Motion to Coinpel 
Discovery regarding the Pooling and Servicing Agreement in his SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION 
FOR CONTINUANCE UNDER RULE 56(f) (R. Vol. 111, p. 552), which the district court 
ignored. Capps' copy of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, the authenticity of which is 
uncontested, constitutes proof ofthe sale of the Receivables and the associated account to the 
Master Trust, making the Trustee, The Bank of New York, the real party in interest, not FIA. 
Capps fulfilled the requirements of Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence making the 
documents admissible. The district court committed reversible error in not admitting the 
documents. Capps therefore requests that this court deem the Second Amended and Restated 
Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated October 20 2006 and the Prospectus dated October 11, 
2005 as admitted into evidence. 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE NO. 3 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR BY IGNORING RULE 1008C OF THE 
IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Capps provided a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy 
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA 
refused to provide the document. Capps providedprima facie evidence that the document was 
what it was purported to he Under Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. FIA did not 
object to the document as not being authentic and did not provide a certified copy of the 
document in its place. The authenticity and weight of the document was for the jury to decide, 
not the district court judge. The document is proof that FIA is not a real party in interest in this 
action and constitutes a dispute of a material fact, which should have precluded granting 
summary judgment by the district court. 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The credibility and weight to be given evidence is in the province of the trier of fact, and the 
findings made by the trial judge will not be set aside urilcss clearly erroneous. Sun Valley 
ShamrockResources, Inc. v. Travelevs Leasing Corp., 118 Idaha 116, 118,794 P.2d 1389, 1391 
(1990); I.R.C.P. 52(a). This court will uphold the trial court's findings of fact if supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955,957-58,855 P.2d 40,42- 
43 (1993); In re baby Boy Doe, 127 Idaho 452,456,902 P.2d 477,481 (1995). On issues of 
law, this court exercises free review. Ausman v. State 124 Idaho 839,841,864 P.2d 1126, 11 28 
(1993). 
C. THE AUTHENTICITY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVlDENCE WAS FOR THE JURY TO 
DECIDE 
Capps demanded a jury trial making the jury the trier of fact. Capps provided a copy of a 
contract in possession of FIA, the Second Amended and Restated Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy 
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA 
refused to provide the document. Capps provided primafacie evidence that the document was 
what it was purported to be Under Rule 1008(c) ofthe Idaho Rules of Evidence. FIA did not 
object to the document as not being authentic and did not provide a certified copy of the 
document in its place. 
In Fox v. Peck Iron and metal Co., Inc., Bkrtcy., 25 B.R. 674 (1982) the court held, "In a 
case tried to a jury, it is for the district judge to determine whether there is prima facie evidence 
to show that the document is what it is purported to be and, for the jury, as the trier of fact, to 
make its own determination of the authenticity of the evidence and the weight which it believes it 
should be accorded. See Federal Rule of Evidence 1008; Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 
586 F.2d 1300, 1302 (9'h Cir. 1978); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 505 
F.Supp. 1190. 1219 @.Pa. 1980). As to the question of the existence of aprirna,facie showing, 
all that is required is substantial evidence from which the trier of fact inigllt conclude that the 
document is authentic." 
In Seiler v. Lucasfilms, Ltd 808 F.2d 13 16 (9"' Cir. 1986) the court stated, "Rule 1008 
provides: When the adt~iissibility of other evidence of contents of writings, recordings, or 
photographs under these rules depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the question 
whether the condition has been fulfilled is ordinarily for the court to determine in accordance 
with the provisio~ls of Rule 104. However, when an issue is raised (a) whether the asserted 
writing ever existed, or (b) whether another writing, recording, or photograph produced at the 
district is the original, or (c) whether other evidence of contents correctly reflects the contents, 
the issue is for the trier offacts to determine as in the case of other issues of fact." The 
conditions in question under Rule 1008(c) are: (1) whether an original can be obtained by any 
available judicial process; (2) whether an adverse party has possession or control over the 
original and, if so, whether proper notice was given to that party; and (3) whether evidence goes 
to a collateral matter or to a controlling issue (commentary - preliminary questions for the court, 
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 1008, p. 656). 
The issues for the judge were (1) to determine whether the original can be obtained by any 
judicial process. Capps had requested thc document in discovery alld FIA had refused to provide 
the document. Capps submitted a motion to compel discovery to the court regarding the Pooling 
and Servicing Agreement (R. Vol. 111, p. 552). The court could have ordered FIA to produce the 
document, but instead chose to ignore Capps' motion. I11 oral argument on September 25 2008 
the following exchange took place (T. Vol. I, p. 28, L. 9-25 & p. 29, L. 1-24): 
MR. CAPPS: "In addition to this, we have requested from FIA Card Services a certified copy of 
the second amended and restated pooling and servicing agreement as of October 20'". I believe 
the year is 2006. 
"This document is essential in our defense against FIA Card Services, as it shows a genuine issue 
over material fact, and that is the standing of FIA Card Services in this case. 
"And as a result of our discovery FIA Card Services has essentially refused to provide the 
document, and subsequent to that we are subn~itting to the court a motion to compel FIA Card 
Services to produce the document or in the alternative to admit the previously submitted pooling 
and servicing agreement as evidence in this case. The pooling and servicing agrecment under the 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 1008(c), the weight or that document as evidence or other evidence of a 
writing. This also is another issue for the jury to decide the weight of whether this constitutes 
evidence or other evidence of a writing. 
"So, in essence, what we have at this point is we have at least three genuine issues that are in 
dispute in this case, and these issues are for the jury to weigh and decide. And as a result, we 
believe that the summary judgment should be vacated and our motion for reconsideration 
granted. 
"And, in addition, FIA withholding the pooling and servicing agreement when it would establish 
a genuine issue for the jury to decide is essentially improper and should not be allowed. They 
should be ordered to put that document on the record, or the summary judgment should be 
vacated simply on that ground alone. 
"THE COURT: We have the fact that you don't have the original agreement, the pooling and 
servicing agreement. What was the third? 
"MR. CAPPS: The third issue is the offered pooling and servicing agreement as evidence of a 
writing or contents of a writing under Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. According 
to the rules this is an issue for tlie jury to weigh and decide whether it is or is not evidence of the 
writing." 
The court was obviously aware that Capps was unable to obtain the original document 
through discovery, so issue (1) was essentially fulfilled. Issue (2) was to determine whether the 
adverse party had possession or co~ltml over the original and, if so, whether proper notice was 
given to that party. It is clear from the document itself that it is an internal document to Bank of 
America under the control of FIA as Servicer. The court commented on Capps' extensive detail 
in his affidavit and consequently must have been aware that FIA had been given both actual and 
inquiry notice regarding the Pooling and Servicing Agreement. The above oral argument also 
establishes that FIA had possession or control over tlie original document. Condition (2) is thus 
fulfilled. Issue (3) for the court to decide was whether the evidence goes to a collateral matter or 
to a controlling issue. The document clearly states that the credit card receivables, and by 
specific definition the account itself, were sold to the Master Trust, assigning all rights, title and 
interest to the Trustee (The Bank of New York). Under Idaho case law once an assignment is 
made the assignor is no longer a real party in interest (see McClusky v. Galland, 95 Idaho 472; 
51 1 P.2d 289 (Idaho 1973), supra), which is a controlling issue. The third condition for the court 
to decide was thus also fulfilled. 
As the commentary in the Federal Rules of Evidence on Rule 1008 explain, under "jury 
issues" (p. 656), "If an issue is raised as to: (a) whether the asserted writing ever existed, (b) 
whether another writing, recording, or photograph produced at the district is the original, or (c) 
whether other evidence of contents correctly reflects the contents, the issue is for the jury to 
determine. An example is provided in the Advisory Committee's Note. "If the plaintiff offers 
secondary evidence of the contents of an alleged contract, having produced evidence to show the 
loss of the original, the District Judge cannot take from the jury the question of whether the 
defendant's claim that no contract was ever executed is sound. If the judge could decide the 
point, the Advisory Committee states that the case is at an end without ever going to the jury on a 
central issue. The same reasoning applies where the question of admissibility is the accuracy of 
the secondary evidence. The parties should not be deprived of a jury trial where what might be 
thought of as a preliminary issue is also the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. Assume A 
and B are involved in a contract dispute, and each offers a photocopy of what each claims the 
contract to be. What are the respective functions of Judge and jury? It seems that the Judge 
should determine the following question: Assuming that A (or B) is correct in asserting that his 
copy is a copy of the actual contract, had A (or B) shown a valid excuse for not producing the 
original? If the answer is yes, the judge should let the evidence in for A, and do the same for B if 
B makes a similar showing, and let the jury decide which of the two copies actually represents 
the contract between the parties." 
Capps provided a copy of the Second Amended and Restated Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement contract between Banlc of America, FIA and the BA Master Credit Card Trust IS (R. 
Vol. IS, p. 273-414), with sufficient pvima facie evidence that the document was what it was 
purported to be (see Capps' affidavit (R. Vol. IT, p. 52- 55). FIA did not object that such a 
contract did not exist. FIA did not object that Capps' copy of the document was not accurate or 
reliable. FIA did not object that Capps' copy of the document was not authentic. FIA did not 
object that the contents of the document provided by Capps did not correctly reflect the contents 
of the original document. It is therefore uncontested that the contract exists, that Capps' copy is 
accurate, reliable, authentic, and correctly reflects the contents of the original contract. Capps 
therefore requests that this court deem the Second Amended and Restated Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement as admitted into evidence. 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE NO. 4 
WAS THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION THAT FIA HAD STANDING AND 
WAS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL AND 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE? 
A, INTRODUCTION 
Capps provided a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit Card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy 
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA 
refused to provide the document. Capps providedprirna facie evidence that the document was 
what it was purported to be Under Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. FIA did not 
object to the document as not being authentic and did not provide a certified copy of the 
document in its place. The authenticity and weight of the document was for the jury to decide, 
not the district court judge. The document is proof that FIA is not. a real party in interest in this 
action and constitutes a dispute of a material fact, which should have precluded granting 
summary judgment by the district court. 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous. . . . On appeal, this Court examines the record to see if challenged findings of fact are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635,637-38, 
132 P.3d 392,394-95 (2006)(citation omitted). 
C. THE STATEMENT USED BY TI-IE DISTRICT COURT IN DECIDING THAT FIA 
HAD STANDING AND WAS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST WAS IN CONFLICT 
WITH THE CONTRACT BETWEEN FIA AND THE MASTER TRUST. 
The terms and conditions relating to the alleged debt and the receivables generated are 
defined by a contract between FIA and the Master Trust. That contract is the Second Amended 
and Restated Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of October 20 2006 (R. Vol. 11, p. 273- 
414). The district court judge, in his MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER dated July 28 
2008 stated (R. Vol. 111, p. 509, L. 11-16), "Nothing in the evidence suggests that FIA Card 
Services transferred to the Master Trust anything more than the receivables on Mr. Capps' 
account. 111 fact, the MBNA Credit Card Master Note Trust Prospectus specifically provides that 
"MBNA transfers the receivables to Master Trust I1 but continues to own the credit card 
accounts." Prospectus, MBNA Credit Card Master Note Trust at 23 (October 20,2006) 
(emphasis added)." The Prospectus is not the contract between FIA and the Master Trust. The 
statement relied on by the district court does not appear in the actual contract: the Pooling and 
Servicing Agreement. There is also no equivalent condition, term or statement in the Pooling 
and Servicing Agreement. 
To the contrary, the Pooling and Servicing Agreement explicitly defines the credit card 
account (with respect to the Receivables now existing and hereafter created for the transfer of 
accounts (as defined in the Delaware UCC)), which is, ' '5 9-102. Definitions and Index of 
Definitions. (a) Article 9 definitions. (2) "Account", except as used in "account for" means (i) 
a right to payment of a monetary obligation whether or not earned by performance, (G) arising 
out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card." 
The "account" is the right to payment of a monetary obligation. What is sold and assigned, with 
all rights, title and interest, to the Master Trust includes, "all monies due or to become due with 
respect to such Receivables (including all Finance Charge Receivables), all Interchange allocable 
to the Trust as provided herein, all proceeds of such Receivables, Insurance Proceeds and 
Recoveries relating to such Receivables and the proceeds thereof." (R. Vol. I1 p. 298). Clearly, 
within the definitions specified in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, the Receivables and the 
"account" are identical. The district court judge's statement that "Nothing in the evidence 
suggests that FIA Card Services transferred to the Master Trust anything more than the 
receivables on Mr. Capps' account." is not based on the facts as presented in the Pooling and 
Servicing Agreement. 
While a prospectus may be used to clarify terms in a contract, it cannot be used to introduce 
entirely new and contrary terms into an existing and settled contract. This is especially true since 
the Pooling and Servicing Agreement is dated more than a year a$eu the Prospectus. The district 
court judge's statement used as ille basis for his decision is not based on the actual contract 
between FIA and the Master Trust but rather on parole evidence that has no real bearing on the 
terms of the contract. The district court's decision is therefore not based on substantial and 
competent evidence and constitutes reversible error. Capps thus requests that this court 
VACATE the district court's decision that FIA has standing and is a real party in interest and 
REMAND the case for trial by a jury. 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE NO. 5 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS BY RENDERING A 
DECISION BEFORE DISCOVERY WAS COMPLETE AND BEFORE THE 
CASE WAS RIPE? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Capps raised two afiirmative defenses in his ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIMS (R. 
Vol. I, p. 22), inler alia, that "18. The Defendant is not a real party in interest in this action and 
cannot maintain a cou~terclaim Action against the Plaintiff.'' And that "1 9. The Defendant 
cannot establish standing and as such cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this court for its 
counterclaims." Capps was pursuing FIA's financial records as proof that FIA had removed the 
account in question from its books as a result of the sale of the account and the associated 
receivables to the BA master Credit Card Trust I1 and was no longer owner of the alleged debt. 
Capps filed a MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (R. Vol. IV, p. 594-600), which the district 
court granted. FIA's answers were evasive and incomplete. Capps filed a MOTION TO SHOW 
CAUSE regarding the evasive and incomplete answers. The district court DENIED the motion 
based on the fact that it had dismissed Capps' claims (R. Vol. 111, p. 565). 
B. STANDARI) OF REVIEW 
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous. . . . On appeal, this Court examines the record to see if challenged findings of fact 
are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 
637-38, 132 P.3d 392, 394-95 (2006)(citation omitted). 
C. DISCOVERY WAS STILL IN PROCESS 
In Dunuiclc v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 882 P.2d 475 (1 984), the Court of Appeals of Idaho 
stated, "The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(c), which is identical in all relevant aspects to I.R.C.P. 56(c), stated, 
In our view, [FINS] the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of snmmary 
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 111 such a situation, 
there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all 
other facts immaterial. The moving party is 'entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' 
because the nonmoving party has failed to malte a sufficient showing on an essential 
element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof. '[The] standard 
[for granting summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under 
Federal Rule oi'Civi1 Procedure 50(a) ...' Celotex Corp. v, Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 
91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986) (citations omitted). 
The language and reasoning of Celotex bas been adopted by the appellate courts of Idaho. 
See, e.g., G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 1 I9 Idaho 5 14,808 P.2d 85 1 (1991); 
Barab v. Plumleigh, 123 Idaho 890,892,853 P.2d 635,637 (Ct. App. 1993); Podolan v. 
Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937,941,854 P.2d 280,284 (Ct. App. 1993); 
Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42,44-45, 844 P.2d 24,26-27 (Ct. App. 1992)" 
One of the crucial elements for a summary judgment hearing was ignored by the district 
court: adequate time for discovery. It is clear from the proceedings that discovery was still in 
progress. The court had not scheduled a time for completion of discovery and several 
discovery related motions were before the court; specifically, Capps' Motion to Show Cause 
(R. Vol. 111, p. ), and his Motion to Compel Discovery (R. Vol. 111, p. 552). 
The implication of the documeilts sought in discovery, as pointed out by the district 
court in the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER of July 22,2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 
495-96), is that "A material fact to these defenses is whether or not FIA Card Services owns 
the account in question. The information requested by Mr. Capps in his Interrogatory 
Request No. 5, namely the financial records relating to the account i11 question, will help 
prove whether FIA in fact owns the account in question. I therefore hold that such 
information is relevant." Since the contents of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement detail 
the sale of the receivables and the associated account, including all rights, title and interest, to 
a third party, it is equally relevant and material to FIA's standing and whether FIA is the real 
party in interest under Rule 17(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The fact that the 
receivables associated with the alleged account, and the alleged account itself, were sold to a 
third party, if proved at trial, would eliminate FIA as a proper plaintiff and also remove the 
jurisdiction of the district court. 
"Due Process is a flexible constitutional principle, and calls for such procedural 
protection as the particular situation demands." In re Baby Doe, 130 Idaho 47, 936 P.2d 690 
(Ct. App. 1997). From State of Idaho, Buerau of Child Support Services v. Garcia, 132 
Idaho 505,975 P.2d 793, (1999) Ida. App. LEXIS 8, "The essence of due process is the right 
to he heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. See also Mathews v. 
Eldridpe, 424 U.S. 319,333,47 L. Ed. 2d 18,96 S. Ct. 893 (1976)." "The 'basic concepts of 
fair play' are 'inexorable safeguards' for due process." Garvev v. Freeman, 397 F.2d 600; 
1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 6309. 
When the dishict court ignored Capps' Motion to Compel Discovery regarding the 
Pooling and Servicing Agreement in favor of granting suinmary judgment to FIA, Capps was 
deprived of the right to be heard at a meaningful time (when the Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement would have been properly on the record as evidence) and in a meaningful manner 
(with solid evidence on the record that FIA was not the real party in interest and had no 
standing). The fact that standing and the real party in interest were issues for the jury and not 
the district court judge is additional evidence of the district court violating Capps' due 
process rights. To deprive Capps of critical evidence and the cooperation of the court in 
obtaining that and additional evidence to support his case violates any sense of fair play and 
removes any concept of safeguards from the judicial process. 
The district court also granted FIA's motion to dismiss Capps' claims while discovery 
was still in progress, ignoring the fact that FIA was evading discovery and violating the 
discovery order of the court. It is clear from the proceedings that due process was not being 
followed and Capps' due process rights were being violated. 
Capps therefore requests that this court VACATE the summary judgment against him, 
VACATE the denial of Capps' Motion to Show Cause, REINSTATE Capps' Motion to 
Compel Discovery, REINSTATE Capps' claims in his complaint, and REMAND this case 
for continued discovery, a jury trial and any remaining procedures. 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE NO. 6 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Capps raised two affirmative defenses in his ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIMS (R. 
Vol. I, p. 22), inter alia, that "1 8. The Defendant is not a real party in interest in this action and 
cannot maintain a counterclaim Action against the Plaintiff." And that "19. The Defendant 
cannot establish standing and as such cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this court for its 
cou~~terclaims." Capps was pursuing FIA's financial records as proof that FIA had removed the 
account in question from its books as a result of the sale of the account and the associated 
receivables to the BA master Credit Card Trust I1 and was no longer owner of the alleged debt. 
Capps filed a MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (R. Vol. IV, p. 594-600), which the district 
court granted. FIA's answers were evasive and incomplete. Capps filed a MOTION TO SHOW 
CAUSE regarding the evasive and incomplete answers. The district court DENIED the motion 
based on the fact that it had dismissed Capps' claims (R. Vol. 111, p. 565). 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. 
. . . On appeal, this Court examines the record to see if challenged findings of fact are supported 
by substantial and competent evidence. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635,637-38,132 P.3d 
392, 394-95 (2006)(citation omitted). 
C. THE SHOW CAUSE MOTION WAS BASED ON AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Two affirmative defenses were raised based on FIA's lack of standing: That FIA was not 
a real party in interest under Rule 17(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure because the 
alleged debt had been sold, with all rights, title and interest assigned to a third party, and that 
FIA could not establish standing because the alleged debt was sold, and FIA could not prove any 
damages. Without actual damages, FIA could not invoke the jurisdiction of the court. 
The fact that the alleged debt was sold is established in both a PROSPECTUS, dated 
October 11,2005 (R. Vol. 11, p. 71-272) and a SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED 
POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT dated October 20,2006 (R. Vol. 11, p. 273-414). 
Capps was pursuing certain FIA financial records generally identified it1 the PROSPECTUS and 
the POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT, as proof that FIA did not have the alleged 
debt on its books, did not claim the alleged debt either as an asset or a liability, did not have any 
ownership interest in the alleged debt, and had no financial damages relating to the alleged debt. 
Capps filed a MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY on April 4 2008 (R. Vol. IV, p. 594-600) 
seeking the nomenclature used in FIA's record keeping system so the specific financial records 
could be properly identified. The district court granted Capps' motion in its April 29 2008 
ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS (R. Vol. IV, p. 601-602). FIA was given 60 days to comply 
with the court's order. 
FIA's response to the court order was evasive and incomplete. Capps then filed a 
MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE on September 11 2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 559-564), asking the 
district court to order FIA to show cause why it should not be held in contempt of court for 
failure to properly comply with the court's order of July 22,2008. In Capps' MOTION TO 
SHOW CAUSE, the issue was clearly identified as being related to Capps' affirmative defenses, 
specifically (R. Vol. 111, p. 560), "Capps has raised affir~uative defenses that FIA 'lacks standing' 
and 'is not a real party in interest under Rule 17(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.' In the 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER of July 22,2008 (R. Vol. 111, p. 495-96), the 
district court held that 'A material fact to these defenses is whether or not FIA Card Services 
owns the account in question. The information requested by Mr. Capps in his Interrogatory 
Request No. 5, namely the financial records relating to the account in question, will help prove 
whether FIA in fact owns the account in question. I therefore hold that such information is 
relevant."' 
On October 30 2008 the district court issued a DECISION AND ORDER stating (R. Vol. 
111, p. 565), "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to show cause why FIA Card Services 
should not be held in contempt of court is DENIED. The issue is moot because Mr. Capps' 
complaint was dismissed." As noted in Capps' motion to show cause (R. Vol. 111, p. 560), the 
issue in Interrogatory No. 5 was related to Capps' affinnative defenses, not his complaint. The 
district court improperly denied Capps' motion to show cause. Capps therefore requests that this 
court REVERSE the district court's order denying his motion, reinstate his Motion to Show 
Cause, and REMAND to the district court br further processing consistent with this court's 
decision. 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE NO. 7 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR BY RELYING ON AN UNSETTLED CASE 
AS THE BASIS FOR ITS DECISION? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Capps providcd a copy of a contract in possession of FIA, the Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement between FIA and the BA Master Credit card Trust 11, and notified FIA that the copy 
was being presented as evidence. The copy was admissible under Rule 1004(3) of the Idaho , 
Rules of Evidence. Capps had sought a certified copy of the contract during discovery and FIA 
refused to provide the document. Capps providedprirna facie evidence that the document was 
what it was purported to be Under Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. FIA did not 
object to the document as not being authentic and did not provide a certified copy of the 
document in its place. The authenticity and weight of the document was for the jury to decide, 
not the district court. The document is proof that FIA is not a real party in interest in this action 
and constitutes a dispute of a material fact, which should have prevented gm~ting summary 
judgment by the district court. 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous. . . . On appeal, this Court examines the record to see if challenged findings of fact 
are suppo~ted by substantial and competent evidence. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 
637-38, 132 P.3d 392, 394-95 (2006)(citation omitted). 
C. THE CASE THE COURT USED AS THE BASIS FOR ITS REASONING WAS ON 
APPEAL 
FIA asked the district court to take judicial notice of a previous case: Citibank (South 
Dakota) N.A. v. Miriam Carroll, CV-06-37067 (Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 35053). 
Capps ob.jected as follows: (R. Vol. 111, p. 421) "The Plaintiff hereby objects based on relevance, 
to the court taking judicial notice as the referenced case and pleadings are different in its terms 
and conditions, as demonstrated in section I above, and therefore are not relevant to this case. In 
addition, the referenced case is currently in appeal and none ofthe issues raised by the Defendant 
are in fact settled. As such, this court should DECLINE judicial notice." 
The court used the reasoning from a case currently on appeal as follows: (R. Vol. 111, p. 
509) "The receivables are separate from the account contract and the one can be transferred 
without the other. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. v. Miriam Carroll, CV-06-37067 (2"* Dist. 
Idalto, December 10,2007). The record reflects that only the receivables on Mr. Capps' account 
were transferred to the Master Trust. As owner of tlte account itself, FIA has standing to collect 
tlte debt owed on the account. It is of no moment that FIA contractually obliged itself to transfer 
the money it collects on its accounts to the Master Trust." 
The Pooling and Servicing Agreement clearly states in section 2.01 (R. Vol. 11, p. 298), "In 
connection with such transfer, assignment, set-over and conveyance, the transferor agrees to 
record and file, at its own expense, all financing statements (including any amendments of 
financing statements and continuation statements when applicable) with respect to the 
Receivables now existing and hereafter created for the transfer of accounts (as defined in the 
Delaware UCC)". (Emphasis added). In section 2.05, the Pooling and Servicing Agreement 
states (R. Vol. 11, p. 306), "Covenants of the Transferor. The Transferor hereby covenants that: 
(a) Receivables to be Accounts. . . . The Transferor will take no action to cause any Receivable 
to he anything other than an account (as defined in the Delaware UCC)." In section 2.09 the 
Pooling and Servicing Agreement also states (R. Vol. 11, p. 3 1 S),  "Additional Representations 
and Warranties of the Transferor. . . .(b) The Collateral constitutes "accounts" witbin the 
meaning of the Delaware UCC." 
Account, as defined in the Delaware UCC is, "$9-102. Definitions and Index of 
definitions. (a) Article 9 definitions. (2) "Account", except as used in "account for" means (i) 
a right to payment of a monetary obligation whether or not earned by performance, (G) arising 
out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card." 
All rights, including the right to payment of a monetary obligation, were transferred and assigned 
to the Master Trust per the Pooling and Servicing Agreement as demonstrated above. There is 
nothing in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement stating that the transferor, or FIA, has retained 
the account after the transfer and assignment to the Master Trust. The Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement clearly establishes that FIA does not own the account. 
The reasoning of the district court was not based on substantial and competent evidence and 
constitutes reversible error. In addition, this decision was for the jury, not the district court 
judge. Capps therefore requests that this court VACATE the summary judgment against him, 
VACATE the district court decision that FIA has standing and is a real party in interest under 
Rule 17(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and REMAND the case for further proceedings 
and a jury trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court made a decision in summary judgment when it was for the jury to weigh 
the evidence and decide the case. There were several genuine disputes over the material facts of 
the case precluding summary judgment. The district court ignored the fact that discovery was 
still in progress, denying Capps his due process rights by granting summary judgment. Capps 
had raised at least two affirmative defenses relating to the real party in interest and the existence 
of damages leading to a lack of standing. Capps also provided documents in support of his 
affirmative defenses substantially proving that FIA was not the real party in interest and did not 
have standing. FIA had the burden of proving that there were no genuine disputes over the 
material facts of the case, and failed to provide any evidence disproving Capps' affirmative 
defenses that FIA was not the real party in interest and did not have standing under Rule 17(a) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The district court first decided Capps' evidence (the Pooling and Servicing Agreement 
and the Prospectus) regarding FIA's not being a real party in interest and not having standing 
could not be considered, and then used that same evidence as the basis for making a decision that 
was for the jury to make. The district court did not make its decision based on competent and 
substantial evidence, but rather on parole evidence that was not relevant or material to the 
contract between FIA and the Master Trust (the Pooling and Servicing Agreement). The district 
court also ignored Rule 1004(3) and Rule 1008(c) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence in crafting its 
judgment against Capps. The district court improperly dismissed Capps' Motion to Show Cause, 
and the claims in his Complaint. 
Capps therefore requests that this court VACATE the summary judgment against him, 
VACATE the district court's decision that FIA is a real party in interest and has standing, 
REINSTATE Capps' Motion to Show cause, the claims in his Complaint, all of his affirmative 
defenses, his Motion to Compel Discovery, DEEM the Prospectus and the Second Amended and 
Restated Pooling and Servicing Agreement as entered into evidence and REMAND this case for 
further discovery, proceedings and a jury trial on all issues. 
Dated this z T M d a y  of April 2009. 
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